Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case of Broadcasting by Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MARKET PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS:
THE CASE OF BROADCASTING
Simon P. Anderson
Stephen Coate
Working Paper   7513
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7513




We thank Tim Besley, John Conley, Simon Cooper, Maxim Engers,   and   Joel   Waldfogel for useful discussions
and   seminar   participants   at   the   Department   of   Justice   and   the   Universities   of   Bristol,   Caen,   California at
Berkeley,   Cergy -Pontoise, and Illinois for helpful comments.  The views expressed herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©  2000 by Simon P. Anderson and Stephen Coate.  All rights reserved.  Short   sections   of   text,   not   to   exceed
two   paragraphs,   may be quoted without explicit permission provided   that   full   credit,   including   ©  notice,   is   given
to the source.Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case of Broadcasting
Simon P. Anderson and Stephen Coate
NBER Working Paper No. 7513
January 2000
JEL No. D43, L13, L82
ABSTRACT
This   paper   studies   the   market   provision   of  a specific type of public good: radio and television
broadcasts.  Its main focus   is   to   explore   the   ability   of   the   market to provide broadcasting efficiently in a
world in which broadcasters earn revenues by selling time to advertisers and advertisements provide
information   to   consumers about new products. The paper   shows   that   market   provided   broadcasts   may
feature   too   few   or too many commercials, depending on the relative sizes of their social benefit and their
nuisance   cost   to   viewers.   In   addition,   the   market may provide too few or too   many   types   of   programs,
depending on the relative size   of viewing benefits and the benefits to advertisers from contacting viewers.
The   possibility   of both under   and   over-provision   of   advertisements   and   programming,   means   that   there   are
ranges of the parameters for   which   the market provides broadcasting close to efficiently. The paper also
considers whether the market performs better under monopoly or   competition   and   studies   how   the ability
to charge viewers subscription prices impacts market performance.
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